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party will allow a search.60 Therefore, the defendant cannot assert the
fourth amendment to bar admission of evidence seized in the search,
not because his rights were waived by the third party, but because he
has relinquished his privacy."' The question whether the waiver
standard applies to the consent of the third party as a relinquishment
of his own right to privacy in the property over which he had control
remained unresolved in those cases. 62
It is clear from the foregoing analysis that the voluntariness test
for determining the validity of a consent to search is neither required
by precedent nor well suited to the policies of the fourth amendment.
Even so, the practical effects of the Court's decision may not be felt
immediately. However, the use of the consent search device to over-
come the warrant and probable cause requirements of the fourth amend-
ment is likely to increase. With voluntariness as the test to be used
for challenged searches, it is not difficult to predict that, in many cases,
unsophisticated defendants will be held to have "waived" constitutional
rights, the existence of which they had no knowledge.
WILLIAM R. SAGE
Environmental Law-Rucker v. Willis: Are Impact Statements
for Private Projects That Require Federal Permits an Endan-
gered Species?
The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA)I has had
a short yet tumultuous history. In declaring a national policy concern-
60. See Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731 (1969). This rationale is logical when
read in conjunction with the "right to privacy" approach to the fourth amendment in
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
61. This approach is consistent with the "misplaced trust" cases in which a de-
fendant is unprotected by the fourth, amendment in his disclosures to a trusted third
party who turns out to be a police informant and who either reports to the police
or simultaneously records or transmits his conversations with the defendant. See, e.g.,
United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971); Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293
(1966).
62. The Supreme Court has not been consistent in -its justification of third party
consents. It initially accepted the rationale that the defendant had made the third
party his agent with "apparent authority" to waive his right to privacy. See Stoner
v. California, 376 U.S. 483 (1964). This "agency" rationale has been thoroughly crit-
icized; see Note, 67 COLUm. L. REv., supra note 28, at 48-50; Note, 113 U. PA. L. REv.,
supra note 42, at 272-77. See generally Hotis, supra note 30, at 417-20; Mintz, supra
note 30, at 49-50; Scurlock, Basic Principles of the Administration of Criminal Justice
with Particular Reference to Missouri Law, 38 U.M.K.C.L. REv. 167, 205-06 (1970).
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-47 (1970).
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ing the environment2 and in establishing certain procedural require-
ments for federal agencies to follow to insure that their activities are en-
vironmentally advisable,3 NEPA was expected to have a profound effect
on all "major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the
human environment."'4  NEPA has lived up to its expectations, 5 in-
volving the judiciary in the storm created by its mandates. 6 Caught in
the midst of NEPA litigation have been the federal agencies on whose
shoulders the brunt of the NEPA burden has fallen. The "new and
unusua '7 instruction to the agencies-to consider the environmental
consequences of their activities "to the fullest extent possible" 8-- is an
attempt to broaden their jurisdictional responsibility,9 to prod them to
internalize environmental considerations, and to force them to expose
their crucial environmental decisions to public scrutiny. Now that
agencies have the statutory obligation to consider fully the environmen-
tal effects of their actions and to "utilize a systematic, interdisciplinary
approach"'10 in planning their activities, some commentators have
2. NEPA § 101, 42 U.S.C. § 4331 (1970).
3. NEPA § 102, 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1970). The now familiar "impact state-
ment" mandated by NEPA is its most far-reaching procedural requirement. NEPA
also created, in the Executive Office of the President, a multi-purpose Council on Envi-
ronmental Quality (CEQ). NEPA § 202, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4342-46 (1970).
4. NEPA § 102(2)(C), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1970).
5. Over 3,000 environmental impact statements had been filed with the Council
on Environmental Quality as of May 30, 1972. Cohen, The Anatomy of Environmen-
tal Impact Statements, 10 LAND & NAT. REsouRcEs L.. 271 (July 1972). It has been
reported that new environmental impact statements "are being received [by CEQ] at
the rate of about five per day." Cramton & Berg, On Leading a Horse to Water:
NEPA and the Federal Bureaucracy, 71 MICH. L. REv. 511, 514 (1973), citing 1972
ANN. REP. OF THE COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALrrY 247.
6. "As of Dec. 1, 1972, there have been at least 140 reported federal court deci-
sions dealing with NEPA challenges to federal projects." Brown, NEPA Litigation
to Date, in 1 A. RErrZE, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 3 (Supp. 1973).
7. City of New York v. United States, 337 F. Supp. 150, 164 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
"NEPA is a new and unusual statute imposing substantive duties which overlie those
imposed on an agency by the statute or statutes for which it has jurisdictional respon-
sibility. Initially harmonizing and integrating the special duties imposed by NEPA
with an agency's traditional regulatory functions is not an easy task." Id. See also
Hanly v. Mitchell, 460 F.2d 640, 644 (2d Cir. 1972).
8. NEPA § 102, 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1970).
9. Justice Douglas in his dissent to the denial of certiorari in Scenic Hudson
Preservation Conference v. FPC, 407 U.S. 926, 927 (1972), stated that the NEPA
"mandate was aimed partly at eliminating the excuse which had often been offered
by bureaucrats that their statutory authority did not authorize consideration of such
factors [as environmental consequences] in their policy decisions." That NEPA has
been effective for Douglas' purpose is indicated by a comment of Harold L. Price,
AEC Director of Regulations, that "We [the AEC] now have to go back and study
things like water quality where we didn't even think we had jurisdiction." 1 A. RPITzE,
supra note 6, at one-42.
10. NEPA § 102(2)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(A) (1970).
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found "a dramatic change in the perspectives of a number of federal
agencies."" Others, however, have noted that agencies are "reluctantly
seeking to comply with the letter, but not the spirit of NEPA."' 2
Agencies have used several defenses in an attempt to avoid NEPA's
obligations. 3 One of these defenses is the contention that a particular
project does not involve a "major Federal action significantly affecting
the quality of the human environment,"'14 and thus the "action forc-
ing"15 command of NEPA's section 102(2)(C) impact statement does
not apply. This note will examine this agency defense against NEPA's
application, especially as it relates to the recent case of Rucker v. Wil-
lis.'6
THE FACTS OF RuCKER V. WILLIS
Defendant Edward Willis owned a tract of land on Bogue Bank"7
near the town limits of Emerald Isle, North Carolina. The property
11. Cramton & Berg, supra note 5, at 512. The authors further report that "in-
siders conversant with the Washington scene agree that the AEC and the Army Corps
of Engineers have undergone a dramatic transformation since enactment of NEPA.
Significant changes in the manner and substance of decision-making in the Departments
of Defense, Interior, and Transportation have also been noted." Id. at 512 n.4. It
has also been argued, however, that "it is fatuous to expect that administrators can
do any more than get a little outside of their normal perspectives." 3 ENvIR. REP.
1434 (March 30, 1973).
12. Note, Environmental Law--Substantive Judicial Review Under The National
Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 51 N.C.L. Rlv. 145, 146 (1972). Cramton & Berg,
supra note 5, at 512, also address this concern: "[T]here is danger that the spirit
[of NEPA] will be undermined-in some agencies-by mere observance of form that
fails to grapple with the underlying realities." Another commentator has noted the
tendency of some agencies to move "with less than deliberate speed" in fulfilling
NEPA's obligations. 3 ENvm. REP. 1434 (March 30, 1973).
13. Brown, supra note 6, gives three categories of cases that have arisen because
of defenses used by federal agencies to justify their decision not to prepare an environ-
mental impact statement. The first category addresses the issue of NEPA's retroactiv-
ity, i.e., whether NEPA's mandates attach to projects begun before 1970. The second
group deals with the agency contention that the agency is exempt from NEPA's man-
date. The third category addresses the agency contention, investigated by this note,
that its action under review is not a major federal action or that it does not signifi-
canty affect the environment. The most predominant question litigated under NEPA
has not been agency defenses but has involved the adequacy of an impact statement
once it is prepared. Brown uses these four broad categories to categorize very effec-
tively all the cases under NEPA.
14. NEPA § 102(2)(C), 42U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1970).
15. The term "action forcing" was a characterization of Sen. Henry Jackson. See
Hearings on S. 1075, S. 237, and S. 1752 Before the Senate Comm. on Interior and
Insular Affairs, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 206 (1969). See also Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating
Comm., Inc. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109, 1113 (D.C. Cir. 1971). As Judge Friendly states
in his dissent in Hanly v. Kleindienst, 471 F.2d 823, 837 (2d Cir. 1972), "Most of
its [NEPA's] provisions are hortatory; the only one with teeth is the [impact statement]
mandate in subdivision (2) (C) . .. ."
16. 358 F. Supp. 425 (E.D.N.C.), aff'd, 484 F.2d 158 (4th Cir. 1973).
17. Bogue Bank is a narrow island off the North Carolina coast. The Bank lies
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stretched across the narrowest part of Bogue Bank where the distance
between the Atlantic Ocean and Bogue Sound is less than six hundred
feet. Defendant Willis and defendant Twin Piers, Inc. agreed to de-
velop this property by constructing a 1,150 foot pier into the Atlantic
Ocean and a pier and marina extending four hundred feet into Bogue
Sound. The marina required that a boat basin and access channel be
dredged in Bogue Sound. Between the marina and the pier a paved
parking lot would be constructed that would occupy practically the en-
tire width of the Bank.
On December 2, 1972, Willis filed with defendant Wilmington Dis-
trict Corps of Engineers a request for a permit" authorizing construc-
tion of the piers and dredging operations. Public notice of Willis' ap-
plication was given on January 4, 1973, by the Corps. 9 The notice in-
dicated that written comments pertinent to the proposed work would
be received in the Corps' Wilmington office until February 5, 1973, and
copies were mailed to approximately one hundred seventy-five govern-
mental agencies, environmental groups, corporations, and individuals.
After receipt of all the comments in response to the public notice,
and after a three month period of "study and consideration,"20 the Corps
determined that the proposed development was not a "major Federal ac-
tion significantly affecting the quality of the human environment,"21
and that therefore no environmental impact statement was required. No
written findings were made by the Corps itself, and no record of the
Corps' own independent analysis of the application was released, if such
an analysis were ever compiled. The Corps simply issued the permit on
April 9, 1973, without comment. Construction on the project began
immediately, and by April 20, 1973, the defendants had completely
directly to the east of the seaside town of Morehead City, and is separated from the
mainland by Bogue Sound.
18. The request was made pursuant to the Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act
of 1899, 33 U.S.C. § 403 (1970). The Act requires a permit to create any "obstruc-
tion" to the "navigable capacity of any of the waters of the United States.
19. The public notice described the project briefly and then stated:
The decision as to whether a permit will be issued will be based on an
evaluation of the impact of the proposed work on the public interest. Factors
affecting the public interest include, but are not limited to, navigation, fish
and wildlife, water quality, economics, conservation, aesthetics, recreation, wa-
ter supply, flood damage prevention, ecosystems, and in general, the needs and
welfare of the people. Comments on these factors will be accepted and made
part of the record and will be considered in determining whether it would be
in the best public interest to grant a permit.
20. The terminology is that of the Fourth Circuit. 484 F.2d at 161. The degree
of "study and consideration" is not specified.
21. See NEPA § 102(2) (C), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2) (C) (1970).
19741
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"leveled the sand dunes"22 between the ocean and the sound. Dredg-
ing and construction began soon afterwards.
On April 19, 1973, adjoining landowners filed an action seeking
injunctive relief against the project. The next day motions for a tem-
porary restraining order and preliminary injunction were heard by the
district court. The court denied these motions, finding that the Corps
of Engineers "followed a systematic procedure and reached a reasonable
decision" in not requiring an environmental impact statement. 3  The
court further found that the issuance of the permit to the defendants'
project was not a "major Federal action. '2 4  The plaintiffs appealed,
and the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court decision. 21
The backbone of the district and circuit court opinions in Rucker
was the holding that the grant of the Corps' permit did not constitute
a "major Federal action significantly affecting the quality of the human
22. 358 F. Supp. at 426.
23. Id. at 430.
24. Id. The decision of the court of appeals and district courts that the Willis
project was not a "major federal action" does not lend itself to lengthy analysis. The
"major federal action" question can be discussed independently of the "significantly af-
fecting" phrase due to the "dual test" used by the Fourth Circuit. See note 54 infra,
Two points on the "major federal action" issue are significant in Rucker.
(1) The permit-project distinction. The district court took notice of the fact that
there were not federal funds involved in the project but merely a federal review for
permit purposes, and held that "reviewing only ...does not constitute 'major federal
action' as contemplated by NEPA." 358 F. Supp. at 430. This view runs directly
contrary to the CEQ guidelines which provide that federal "'actions' include ... (ii)
Projects and continuing activities . . . involving a federal lease, permit, license, certifi-
cate, or other entitlement for use." 36 Fed. Reg. 7724-29 (1971), see note 33 infra.
The district court holding also runs contrary to the Corps' own regulations which contain
guidelines and procedures to be followed when "Regulatory Permits" are involved in
projects that "would have a significant and adverse effect" on environmental quality.
37 Fed. Reg. 2526 (1972); see note 65 infra.
The Fourth Circuit apparently corrected the district court's implication that NEPA
applied only to projects and not permits. The court of appeals stated: "Although issu-
ing a permit for such a pier is undoubtedly federal action, whether it is major federal
action ... [is a] factual matter" to be determined by the district judge. 484 F.2d
at 163.
(2) The jurisdiction question. There is a latent dispute about the scope of the
Corps' jurisdiction in evaluating the Willis project. The district court found ,t large
percentage of the project "above mean-high water line," and declared correctly that
federal jurisdiction only extended to the mean-high mark. The Corps' public notice,
however, places no such limitation on the scope of the Corps' inquiry when the Corps
seeks to evaluate the environmental effects of a project for permit purposes. See note
19 supra. See also Zabel v. Tabb, 430 F.2d 199 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401
U.S. 410 (1971) (ecology of area taken into account); Citizens for Clean Air, Inc.
v. Army Corps of Engineers, 349 F. Supp. 696, 700-01 ("total impact" to be consid-
ered); 33 C.F.R. §§ 209.120(d)(1), (3) (1973) (Corps regulations: effect on conser-
vation, pollution, aesthetics, ecology, and adjacent shore properties is to be considered).
25. Rucker v. Willis, 484 F.2d 158 (4th Cir. 1973). Judge Widener was joined
by Chief Judge Haynsworth, with Circuit Judge Craven dissenting.
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environment."2 6  Considerable conflict over the meaning of this NEPA
phrase has been created by attempts to interpret what has been charac-
terized as NEPA's "opaque" and "woefully ambiguouse '' - language.
Implicit in these attempts have been efforts to balance competing inter-
ests. On the one hand, is the need to avoid the application of NEPA
to agency actions that are "too trivial, too routine, or too remote in
consequences to merit an impact statement. ' 28  On the other hand, is
the realization by the courts that if they determine that an agency ac-
tion does not fall within the NEPA phrase, NEPA will not be activated
at all, and all of its procedural and substantive safeguards will be
avoided. From this perspective, some have realized that if no major
and significant federal action is found, NEPA's effectiveness would be
negated "in the most fundamental way" in that "low level federal activi-
ties would be exempted"'29 from the statute's mandates. For these rea-
sons "the courts have policed the lower boundaries of NEPA's applica-
tion with greater than ordinary vigilance and have worked in concert
with the CEQ [Council of Environmental Quality] guideline-setting
process to keep the threshold low." 30
THE SCOPE OF AN AGENCY'S DISCRETION IN MAKING A THRESHOLD
IMPACT STATEMENT DETERMINATION
There have been scattered judicial attempts to clarify NEPA's stat-
utory language,3" even in the face of an early admonition that NEPA's
26. For a comprehensive collection of other cases decided on a basis similar to
Rucker, see F. ANDERSON, NEPA IN THE COURTS: A LEGAL ANALYSIS OF THE NA-
TIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AcT 77-79 & nn.90-99 (1973) [hereinafter cited as
NEPA IN THE COURTS].
27. See Hanly v. Kleindienst, 471 F.2d 823, 825 (2d Cir. 1972), citing City of
New York v. United States, 337 F. Supp. 150, 159 (E.D.N.Y. 1972); Voigt, The Na-
tional Environmental Policy Act and the Independent Regulatory Agency, 5 NATURAL
RESOURCES LAW. 13 (1972).
28. NEPA IN THE COURTS 82.
29. Id. at 74.
30. Id. at 74-75.
31. See Hanly v. Kleindienst, 471 F.2d 823, 830-31 (2d Cir. 1972) (attempting
to clarify "significantly affecting"); Hanly v. Mitchell, 460 F.2d 640, 644 (2d Cir.
1972) (commenting on meaning of "major federal action"); Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc. v. Grant, 341 F. Supp. 356, 366-67 (E.D.N.C. 1972) (defining both
phrases). The court of appeals in Rucker noted four definitional indicia which might
also be used to measure if a permit is a "major federal action." These involved (1)
the use of federal funds, (2) federal designing or planning involvement, (3) projects
carried out "under the auspices of a federal agency," and (4) the qualitative impact
on the environment. The court found none of these indicia to be present in Rucker.
484 F.2d at 163. The court held that "the record now indicates" that the Willis proj-
ect would not significantly affect the environment. Id. Contrary readings of the rec-
ord are possible, as shown by Judge Craven's dissent. See note 54 infra as to (4)
above.
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language is "extremely broad and not susceptible of precise definition. '3 2
More frequent than efforts to define specifically the "major federal ac-
tion" and the "significantly affecting" phrases, however, have been at-
tempts on a case-by-case basis to refine and determine the essence of
NEPA's mandate in this area. Many cases have placed emphasis on
the CEQ guidelines."8 The most productive effort, however, has oc-
curred in several judicial attempts to define the scope of an agency's
autonomy in making the threshold determination of whether an impact
statement is necessary.3 4
In S.C.R.A.P. v. United States,3" the plaintiffs sought to enjoin an
Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) order allowing railroads tem-
porarily to add a 2.5 percent surcharge to the normal rate charged for
freight. S.C.R.A.P. charged that the freight increase constituted a ma-
jor federal action significantly affecting the environment since the ship-
ping increase boosted the cost of shipping recyclable materials and ag-
gravated the preexisting disparity in shipping costs between these ma-
terials and the primary goods with which they compete.8 10 The ICC
dismissed the attacks on its actions in one terse sentence: "IThe involved
general increase will have no significant adverse effect on .. . the
quality of the human environment within the meaning.. ." of NEPA.a7
Judge J. Skelly Wright responded to the ICC's actions:
It should be obvious that the NEPA requirement cannot be
circumvented by so transparent a ruse. The main purpose of an
impact statement is to force assessment of the environmental im-
32. Citizens for Reid State Park v. Laird, 336 F. Supp. 783, 789 (D. Me. 1972).
33. 36 Fed. Reg. 7724-29 (1971). The importance of the CEQ guidelines will
become evident infra. For a common perspective on the CEQ guidelines, see Students
Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (S.C.R.A.P.) v. United States, 346 F. Supp.
189, 200 n.14 (D.D.C. 1972), which notes that "[a]Ithough the CEQ guidelines lack
the force of law, we should 'not lightly suggest that the Council, entrusted with the
responsibility of developing and recommending national policies "to foster and promote
the improvement of the environmental quality," . . . has misconstrued NEPA." The
CEQ has recently proposed certain amendments to their guidelines. 38 Fed. Reg.
10856 (1973).
34. No courts challenge the agency's power to make the threshold determination
-as to that power, NEPA is clear. See Citizens for Clean Air, Inc. v. Army Corps
of Engineers, 349 F. Supp. 696, 706-07 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), citing Hanly v. Mitchell,
460 F.2d 640 (2d Cir. 1972); Citizens for Reid State Park v. Laird, 336 F. Supp.
783, 789 (D. Me. 1972) ("The Act plainly commits this preliminary determination
to the agency."). When the agencies' threshold decision is challenged, then the court's
role begins. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Grant, 341 F. Supp. 365, 366
(E.D.N.C. 1972); Scherr v. Volpe, 363 F. Supp. 886, 888 (W.D. Wis. 1971).
35. 346 F. Supp. 189 (D.D.C. 1972), rev'd, 93 S. Ct. 2405 (1973).
36. 346 F. Supp. at 191.
37. Id. at 200. See also id. at 200 n.16.
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pact of a proposed action. Therefore, a statement is required
whenever the action arguably will have an adverse impact.38
Soon after S.C.R.A.P., the Second Circuit in Hanly v. Mitchell"0
was given the opportunity to pass on the sufficiency of a General Service
Administration (GSA) determination that an impact statement was not
needed prior to the construction of a detention center in an area of
lower Manhattan. The court in Hanly I determined that the "peculiar"
environmental impact of the jail project was not sufficiently detailed in
the short GSA "Environmental Statement." The GSA then compiled a
twenty-five page "Assessment" of the environmental impact of the pro-
posed jail. The district court found the assessment to be adequate, but
the Second Circuit in Hanly 11 again reversed.40  The decision in
Hanly II is presently the most refined-and demanding-inquiry into
the adequacy of an agency's threshold impact statement determination.
There were two bases for the reversal in Hanly 1I-the substan-
tive inadequacy of the assessment itself in considering the environmen-
tal effects of the jail, and the procedural inadequacy of the GSA's ad-
ministrative process in determining those effects. Two elements caused
the court's finding of substantive inadequacy. The first element was
the assessment's failure to deal conclusively with the possibility of a
drug maintenance program at the detention center, which the appel-
lant's charged would increase the risk of crime in the area. The sec-
ond element was an affidavit received by the district court that chal-
lenged certain findings of fact in the assessment.41 The Hanly II
court found that these two factors conclusively established the assess-
ment's substantive inadequacy. This holding represents an unques-
tionably strict review of any agency's threshold determination that an
impact statement is unnecessary. The appellants presentation of two
factual issues that went unanswered by the assessment was sufficient to
38. Id. at 201 (emphasis in original). The Supreme Court's subsequent reversal
of the district court in S.C.R.A.P. left intact the essence of Judge Wright's impact state-
ment requirements. The Court did find, however, that NEPA did not limit the ability
of the ICC to set rates, for rate setting was found to be an exclusive ICC function
due to the Interstate Commerce Act. Thus, the basis of the reversal was primarily
jurisdictional, and did not reach the question of the adequacy of the ICC's threshold
impact statement process. "We need not reach the issue whether the District Court
was justified in issuing a preliminary injunction, because we have concluded that the
court lacked jurisdiction to enter an injunction in any event." S.C.R.A.P. v. United
States, 93 S. Ct. 2405, 2417 (1973).
39. Hanly v. Mitchell, 460 F.2d 640 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 990 (1972)
(Hanly I).
40. Hanly v. Kleindienst, 471 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 93 S. Ct.
2290 (1973).
41. See 471 F.2d at 834-36.
1974]
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convince the court of the incompleteness of the study. In this light, one
must broadly construe the Hanly II observation that "an agency, in mak-
ing a threshold determination as to the 'significance' of an action, is
called upon to review in a general fashion the same factors that would
be studied in depth for preparation of a detailed environmental impact
statement . *."..2 Hanly II seems to require that all disputed factual
issues and asserted concerns presented by a plaintiff must be at least
generally responded to in a threshold statement. This conclusion is
consistent with the Hanly I finding that "the essential point is that GSA
[the agency] must actually consider [the plaintiff's concerns]. ' 8
The procedural grounds for the decision in Hanly II are also signi-
ficant. The court made the finding that the procedural mandates of
sections 102(2)(A), (B), and (D) of NEPA44 apply not only to ac-
tions which the agency finds to be significant, but also to actions under
review even at the threshold impact statement level. 45 The court then
determined that section 102(2)(A) and (D) had been met by the as-
sessment, but that (B) had not.4 6 Holding that section 102(2)(B) re-
quired that "some rudimentary procedures be designed to assure a fair
and informed preliminary decision, ' 47 the court expanded Hanly l's
mandate that federal agencies must "affirmatively develop a reviewable
environmental record . . . even for purposes of a threshold section
102(2)(C) determination. ' 4  The expansion was achieved by requir-
ing that public notice of the proposed federal action be given by the
agency before a determination of "significance" is made, and by sug-
gesting that provision for public hearings on the action may in some in-
stances be advisable.49
The stringent procedural and substantive standards established in
Hanly II may attract substantial adherents. The tone and strictness of
Hanly 11 are already matched by the language of Citizens for Clean Air,
Inc. v. Army Corps of Engineers,5" which, like Rucker, involved the
granting of a Corps' dredge and fill permit. At issue was the possible
air pollution caused by Consolidated Edison's construction of an elec-
42. Id. at 835.
43. 460 F.2d at 648.
44. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4332(2)(A), (B), (D) (1970).
45. 471 F.2d at 834-35.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 835.
48. 460 F.2d at 647.
49. See note 59 infra, as to how these procedural holdings apply to Rucker.
50. 349 F. Supp. 696 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
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trical generating plant in New York City. The Corps granted the permit
without filing an impact statement. 51 The district court responded:
Without making its own analysis of the impact of the con-
struction, it [the Corps] merely cited the fact that state permits
were given and the Department of the Interior did not object,
and the EPA "offered no objection . . . ." [T]his perfunctory
listing of other agencies' conclusions is an inadequate record to
support the Corps' threshold determination, and legally constitutes
arbitrary and capricious action .... 52
The fact that no one explicitly attacked two environmental
features of the project . . . alone cannot serve as a basis alone
for the Army Corps' finding that there would be no significant
impact on the environment. . . . Negative evidence of environ-
mental impact . . . cannot be substituted for the Corps' affirma-
tive determination, independently made, that the impact is insig-
nificant. 53
The court held that the permit previously issued was void.
THREE DEFECTS IN RUCKER v. WILLIS
Judged against this background,54 the decision in Rucker is subject
to three defects that cast doubt on its correctness.
a. The Scope of the Agency Discretion Permitted by Rucker. One
defect in Rucker involves the burden an agency must sustain to support
its threshold determination that an impact statement is not necessary.
This issue is crucial in Rucker for several reasons. First, the Corps "is-
51. The similarities between Rucker and Citizens are clear. One point of distinc-
tion between the cases, however, was that in Citizens the factor of major federal action
was conceded by the Corps; the same concession was also made in the Hanly dispute.
52. 349 F. Supp. at 707. This quote was preceded by the finding that "The Corps
has the duty of making clear its threshold decision, the rationale for the decision, and
the means of arriving at that determination . .. ." Id. This is exactly what was
lacking in Rucker.
53. Id. at 707 n.18 (emphasis in original).
54. Within the NEPA phrase, the "major federal action" question can be dis-
cussed independently of the "significantly affecting the . . . environment" phrase due
to the dual test used by the Fourth Circuit. See Natural Resources Defense Council
v. Grant, 341 F. Supp. 356, 366-67 (E.D.N.C. 1972). See also the Second Circuit's
statement in Hanly I, "We agree . . . that the two concepts are different . . . ." 460
F.2d at 644. There is apparently some overlap in the tests even in the Fourth Cir-
cuit, however; by using the "qualitative impact" on the environment as an indicia for
determining major federal action, note 31 supra, the Rucker court implicitly holds that
if the environmental effect of any project is significant, it will always be a major fed-
eral action, regardless of the project's size. This coincides with the conclusion that
"[w]hile the cases favor a two-test standard, they have never held that the small size
of a federal project will exempt it from NEPA if its environmental effects are signifi-
cant." NEPA IN THE CouRTs 74. A more complete review of the dual test as op-
posed to the one test standard is beyond the scope of this note.
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sued no written findings. Neither did it specifically state that an im-
pact statement was not necessary."55  This defect is by no means fa-
tal,5 6 yet the failure to file any written findings raises the precise objec-
tions that were voiced by the courts in Hanly I and 1I and Citizens for
Clean Air involving the insufficiency of the agencies' investigation in
support of its threshold impact statement determination.
The absence of written findings takes on added significance in
Rucker because the Corps' decision not to prepare an impact statement
"was based on the fact that no Federal, State, or local agencies certified to
[it] that the permit would have a significant and adverse effect on the
human environment.157 Despite the fact that the Corps is the lead
agency on the project and must comply with NEPA "to the fullest extent
possible," the agency relied not on its own independent examination5 8
but on the absence of certification by others. Aside from the fact that
this places the agency with primary responsibility for federal action in
deference to other agencies and groups who were merely asked for com-
ments on an application for a permit, it also appears that the Corps was
subtly delegating what should be its overall responsibility to other agen-
cies. The court in Citizens for Clean Air unequivocally rejected this
procedure: "Whis perfunctory listing of other agencies' conclusions is
an inadequate record to support the Corps' threshold deternina-
tion . . .,.
55. Rucker v. Willis, 484 F.2d 158, 159 n.2 (4th Cir. 1973). The court con-
tinues: "From the issuance of the permit, however, the necessary inference is a finding
that no impact statement was necessary, since the statute, 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2) (C), and
the applicable regulation, 37 Fed. Reg. 2525 (Feb. 2, 1972), para. 11(c), both require
a statement if their conditions are met, but do not require a negative finding or state-
ment." Id. The court's reading of the regulations is rather dated and selective, as argued
by Iudge Craven's dissent. The Corps' new guidelines require written findings setting
forth the reasons for not preparing an impact statement. Reg. No. 1105-2-507, §§ 4
(b)(2), 5(g)(2). 38 Fed. Reg. 9243-44 (1973). However, the effectiveness of these
new guidelines is put into question by the Rucker decision. Even if the new regulations
do effectively end the tactics the Corps used in Rucker, the issue is still alive for most
other federal agencies affected by NEPA.
56. See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 409
(1971), where the Court states that "formal findings were not required." Judge Cra-
ven notes in his dissent the extenuating circumstances in Overton Park, and concludes
that the new Corps' regulations should be applied to Rucker. 484 F.2d at 164.
57. 358 F. Supp. at 429.
58. Such an independent examination was required in Hanly I and 1I, supra notes
39-49, and Citizens for Clean Air, supra notes 50-53.
59. 349 F. Supp. at 707. In concluding this discussion of the procedural aspects
of Rucker, it is helpful to compare the procedure of Rucker to the procedural mandate
given in Hanly II, supra notes 47-49. Since the public notice was given in Rucker
the first procedural complaint of Hanly I was satisfied. However, the second proce-
dural suggestion (but not requirement) of Hanly II, the use of a public hearing, is espe
cially intriguing when applied to Rucker. Hanly II noted that the public hearing was
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Although the Corps merely relied on the lack of adverse comments 0
to determine that no impact statement was necessary, they convinced the
Rucker court that the agency had made a "wide-ranging, good-faith as-
sessment . . .of the potential environmental impact of the proposed
project." 61 At no point, however, is there evidence that the Corps or
any other agency addressed many of the substantial adverse effects
which the plaintiffs alleged.6 2 The manner in which the Corps did deal
with problems they characterized as "essentially matters of local zoning"
was similarly superficial. 3 It is obvious that the Corps' threshold pro-
cedure did not, as Hanly I and II required, cover generally all the sub-
stantive areas that a full impact statement would more specifically de-
scribe. The Rucker procedure, which required no written findings by
the Corps itself, did not allow the plaintiffs an opportunity to deter-
mine if the Corps had even considered many of their substantive con-
cerns.
b. The CEQ "Cumulative Impact" Guideline. The second major
defect of the Rucker decision involves the court's failure to respond ade-
a "procedure usually followed in zoning disputes." 471 F.2d at 835. It was noted
in Rucker that most of the complaints against the pier and marina were "essentially
matters of local zoning." See note 63 infra. It thus appears that Rucker provided
the perfect procedural setting in which to use the Hanly 11 public hearing suggestion.
The Corps' own regulations provide for public hearings, 33 C.F.R. § 209.120(g) (1972),
so the idea is by no means unusual.
60. The Corps did receive quite a few adverse comments--one of which was a
petition signed by 70 landowners. The United States Department of the Interior, Fish
and Wildlife Service commented by recommending that the permit should be denied
unless their modifications were incorporated into the permit. One of these modifica-
tions was that dredging be limited to 5 feet-due to a turbidity problem-for the boat
basin. The district court noted that the Department of the Interior proposal was made
a part of the permit. Yet, the permit actually issued allows dredging to 7 feet for
the boat basin. The discrepancy is unexplained in the record. 358 F. Supp. at 429.
61. 484 F.2d at 162.
62. The following adverse effects were alleged by the plaintiffs, but were virtually
ignored by the court: increased erosion, susceptibility to damage of Bogue Bank during
hurricanes, destruction of the natural beauty of Bogue Bank, interference with eel
grasses on Bogue Sound (also a concern of the Department of the Interior), destruction
of shellfish and fish life on the bottom of the sound, elimination of habitat of distiuct
tive birds, increased pollution from fishing on the piers and use of the marina by boats,
overloading of sanitary sewage systems, and overcommercialization and overcrowding
of the island. See Brief for Appellants at 3, Rucker v; Willis, 484 F.2d 158 (4th
Cir. 1973).
63. Letter from Albert C. Costanzo to Mr. Edward E. Willis, March 22, 1973.
The Corps characterized many of the criticisms expressed as problems of local zoning
and referred these criticisms to the Carteret County Planning Board. The Planning
Board responded that there was no zoning of the Willis property (plaintiff's expert
testimony showed that residential zoning was imminent for the area). The Corps used
the fact that there was no zoning of the area to conclude that no objection from the
Planning Board was given. See Appendix to Brief for Appellants at 36, Rucker -v.
Willis, 484 F.2d 158 (4th Cir. 1973).
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quately to one component of the CEQ's agency guidelines regarding the
NEPA "major federal action-significantly affecting" clause. The
guidelines note that a project "is to be construed by agencies with a
view to the overall, cumulative impact of the action proposed ....
[s]uch actions may be localized in their impact, but if there is potential
that the environment may be significantly affected, the [impact] state-
ment is to be prepared. '8 4  In Rucker it appears that this "cumulative
impact" guideline was used by the court to bolster the merits of the
project. The court used the fact that piers already existed to support its
decision on the new pier and not to point to the cumulative ill-effects of
pier after pier.65
This reverse use of the cumulative clause is unusual, yet it is not
as great an error as the court's failure to note the possible cumulative
effect of the marina and the project as a whole. The complaints of the
plaintiffs that raised these issues were ignored by the court. In addi-
tion to ignoring the marina's cumulative effect, the court also ignored
the CEQ guidelines concerning the "potential" for significant environ-
mental damage. This factor is significant in light of the plaintiff's ex-
pert testimony that the project may result in the "[b]reaching of Bogue
Bank during a storm, caused by the stabilized area on which the im-
provements are located focusing the storm energy on the unprotected
areas of the Bank on either side."06  Since no impact statement will now
64. CEQ Guidelines, § 5(b), 36 Fed. Reg. 7724 (1971).
65. Judge Craven in his dissent recognized this infirmity in the court's decision
by noting:
I do not know how many fishing piers are too many, but I think that
too many may substantially alter the environment of North Carolina's price-
less Outer Banks. It is, of course, true that the issuance of a permit by the
Corps to construct a boat dock on an island waterway for a private home-
owner is not major federal action requiring the preparation of an impact state-
ment. But what about the 500th such permit, or the 10,000th one? At some
point, "zoning" and environmental impact merge. Ecology is largely a matter
of land use.
484 F.2d at 164 (Craven, J., dissenting).
Judge Craven found himself in agreement with the Corps' own regulations which
favor the threshold test of whether the action "could have a significant adverse effect
on the quality of the environment, not whether it would have such an effect." Id.
See also 37 Fed. Reg. 2525 (1972). Judge Craven felt "the construction of such a
fishing pier and marina could adversely affect" Bogue Bank. 484 F.2d at 164 (empha-
sis in original). See also Hanly v. Kleindienst, 471 F.2d 823, 831 (2d Cir. 1972).
The district court that decided Rucker was aware of the cumulative impact guideline,
for the court had used it previously in Natural Resources Defense Council v. Grant,
341 F. Supp. 356, 367 (E.D.N.C. 1972) ("The cumulative impact. . . must be consid-
ered.") Contra, Kisner v. Butz, 350 F. Supp. 310 (N.D.W. Va. 1972).
66. Expert testimony of Orrin H. Pilkey in Appendix to Brief for Appellant at
16. The fact that the court ignored these and other complaints of the plaintiffs', see
note 62 supra, is especially interesting in light of the Hanly I statement at text accom-
panying note 43 supra.
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be compiled, no further study of that potential danger will be under-
taken. Thus the accuracy of the expert testimony can only be tested
in one singularly imprudent way-by waiting for a winter storm to oc-
cur.
c. The CEQ "Controversial" Guideline. The CEQ guidelines dic-
tate that environmental impact statements should be prepared with re-
spect to "[piroposed actions, the environmental impact of which is likely
to be highly controversial."67 The court in Rucker chose a narrow inter-
pretation of that guideline by rejecting the idea that "'controversial'
must necessarily be equated with opposition.168  The term, said the
court, "should properly refer to cases where a substantial dispute exists
as to the size, nature or effect of the major federal action rather than to
the existence of opposition to a use."6' 9 The Rucker court followed the
majority in Hanly ii in assuming that "[t]o require an impact state-
ment whenever a threshold determination dispensing with one is likely
to face a court challenge. . . would surrender the determination to op-
ponents of a major federal action, no matter how insignificant its envi-
ronmental effect when viewed objectively. '70
This perspective flies in the face of the natural meaning of the
words.71 The argument that "substantial dispute [must] exist as to the
effect of the action, rather than to the existence of opposition to it ' 72
would seem to be based on a play on words, the unmistakable inten-
tion of which is to "raise the floor" for the use of the "controversial" test
by any plaintiff.
In resorting to such a narrow interpretation of the "controversial"
guideline, the Rucker court erred in two respects. First, when the
guidelines are narrowly interpreted, their effect is unnecessarily lim-
ited-and thus their underlying policies are negated. The strength of
the policy to encourage the use of impact statements should mandate a
broad interpretation of the guidelines. Particularly as to the "contro-
67. CEQ Guidelines § 5(b), 36 Fed. Reg. 7724 (1971).
68. 484 F.2d at 162.
69. Id.
70. 471 F.2d at 830 n.9A.
71. Id. at 839 (Friendly, C.J., dissenting). Judge Friendly also thought that the
"likely to be highly controversial" limitation in the guideline answered the plaintiffs'
fears of surrendering the determination to the opponents of a major federal action.
72. Brief for Appellants at 9, Rucker v. Willis, 484 F.2d 158 (4th Cir. 1973).
Hanly i notes that controversial "apparently refers to cases where a substantial dispute
exists as to the size, nature or effect of the major federal action rather than to the
existence of opposition to a use, the effect of which is relatively undisputed." 471
F.2d at 830.
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versial" guideline, it should be recognized that controversial projects in-
vite lawsuits, 73 and preparing a sound and thorough impact statement
may avoid resort to the courts by agency opponents. The final effect of
a broad interpretation of the guidelines would be the encouragement
of a policy of impact statement preparation that would be beneficial to
the agency, the project's opponents, and the environment.7 4  Secondly,
it is not at all clear that the plaintiff's allegations and the facts in the ad-
ministrative record fail to meet even the narrow test. Not only was there
"opposition" to the Willis project, but the opposition was almost entirely
directed at the adverse effects of the project. Controversy for the sake
of controversy did not appear to be the plaintiffs intention.7
Two SUGGESTIONS TO PREVENT FUTURE "RUCKERS"
The Rucker decision raises doubt as to the future effectiveness of
73. This factor has been noted by Judge Friendly in his Hanly II dissent, 471
F.2d at 839. See also Nolop v. Volpe, 331 F. Supp. 1364, 1368 (D.S.D. 1971) ("The
mere existence of this lawsuit shows that organized opposition has occurred.") The
Hanly II majority rejected the suggestion that "'controversial' must be equated with
neighborhood opposition." 471 F.2d at 830.
74. Impact statement preparation would be good for the Corps, for it has been
a consistent victim of environmental criticism; beneficial to the environment by pos.
sibly providing new information making reconsideration of the project's effects appro-
priate; and good for the opponents by "allowing opponents to blow off steam and giv-
ing them the sense that their objections have been considered-an important purpose
of NEPA." 471 F.2d at 839 (Friendly, C.J., dissenting).
75. Regardless of these arguments, however, perhaps the only way to conclude
successfully the "controversial" dispute would be for the CEQ to simply omit this pro-
posal from their agency guidelines. The "controversial" guideline is especially inappro-
priate in threshold impact statement disputes. In Rucker, all the project opponents
had was a "public notice" of an application which noted that only four weeks were
available for comment. Many opponents may have been waiting for a more appropri-
ate stage-perhaps on circulation of the draft impact statement-to comment. In wait-
ing, however, the opponents were foreclosed completely from commenting except in
the context of a lawsuit against the Corps for its failure to consider more fully the
project's adverse effects. Controversy often takes months to brew, and in its seminal
stages it may either be dismissed as temporary and spontaneous opposition or go un-
noticed altogether. Yet, the courts may use the initial lack of controversy to restrict
severely NEPA's reach. The misuse of this guideline-or a too restrictive interpre-
tation of it -may also be used subtly to shift the NEPA burden off the lead agency
and onto a project's opponents, for the guideline has the clear potential of placing an
additional burden on environmental plaintiffs. In the case of disputed projects that
are not large enough to be obviously "major" or "significant," the project's opponents
have, under this guideline, the responsibility to raise a squabble large enough to con-
vince the agency that a controversy exists and that therefore an impact statement is
required. Yet the degree to which NEPA is utilized should not depend on a count
of the voices raised calling for its use. The NEPA burden is on the lead agencies,
not on citizen groups.
Finally, there is something inherently bizarre about a court facing two antagonistic
adversaries arguing before it in a ripe dispute and concluding that there is not enough
controversy outside the courtroom to allow the plaintiffs to win once they get in.
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NEPA in dealing with private projects that require federal permits.7
Two responses to this uncertainty are available.
First is the possible development of per se categories under NEPA.
The application of this concept to the question of major federal actions
would, in some instances, effectively insure that NEPA's safeguards
would attach. Little case law dealing with this approach exists. 7 Some
courts are openly hostile to the per se idea,78 yet one has "expressed
qualified optimism that 'it may be possible in the future to develop
some per se categories of major federal actions . . . . 79 The activities
of several agencies suggests that a per se process has already developed
in regard to their projects.8" However, there is a danger, in the initial
development of the per se idea, of thinking too much in terms of agen-
cies rather than in terms of specific projects. A shift to thinking in
terms of geographical and ecological areas and activities in those areas
should evolve. Not everything a particular agency does should be per se
a major federal action, but everything that any federal agency does
in such an area involving specified destructive activities (i.e., dredging
and filling in an estuary, or construction in a flood-plain) should be per
se a major federal action.
One frustration for the project's opponents in Rucker was the reali-
zation that the fragile nature of the estuarine area around Bogue Bank
might have been overlooked by the Corps. The delicacy and uniqueness
of the estuarine ecosystem is well documented, especially the degree to
which an action in one locale may have disasterous consequences per-
haps miles away.8' With this realization, it seems appropriate that
NEPA should apply to federal action in an estuarine area on a per se
76. There is already some hostile commentary on applying NEPA to the permit-
ting activities of various agencies. See 3 E-vm. REP. 1434 (March 30, 1973)
(NEPA's effectiveness will be "voided" if courts do not recognize that "NEPA was
designed to deal with the large, federally financed projects" and not with "governmental
regulations of essentially private activities. .. ").
77. For an excellent discussion of the per se concept under NEPA, see NEPA
IN THE CouRTs 84-87.
78. Transcontinental Gas Pipeline Corp. v. Hackensack Meadowlands Dev.
Comm., 464 F.2d 1358, 1366 (3d Cir. 1972).
79. NEPA IN Tim CouRTs 84, citing Sierra Club v. Hardin, 325 F. Supp. 99,
126 n.52 (D. Alas. 1971).
80. See NEPA IN Tr CouiRs 84-87.
81. E.g., 3 FisH & WILDLIFE SERV., U.S. DEPT. OF THE INTERIOR, NATIONAL Es-
TuARY STUDY, H.R. Doc. No. 286, Parts I-rI, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970); Proceedings
of the North Carolina Inter-Agency Council on Natural Resources, Nov. 21, 1967; E.
Odum, The Role of Tidal Marshes in Estuarine Production, in ESTUARINE RESOURcEs
14 (1969); Schoenbaum, Public Rights and Coastal Zone Management, 51 N.C.L.
REv. 1 (1972).
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basis. NEPA's impact statement process need not be followed when-
ever any federal agency did anything anywhere in an estuary. Neverthe-
less, a more intensive review of how a project is to be done, and what it
involves, could be utilized when the project was undertaken in an area
such as an estuary, or a redwood forest, or a national park. Especially
the more "physically destructive actions"82 in these areas-such as
dredging and filling-could be classified as per se major federal ac-
tions. The per se classification would then not develop arbitrarily, but
would develop rationally in relation to delicate areas and especially de-
structive methods in those areas. Resort to an entire estuarine area is
certainly not necessary-delineation of specific areas within an estuary
would be more realistic. This delineation might easily be accomplished
in North Carolina.8 3
A second suggestion to prevent further decisions like Rucker
grows from the realization that in some instances NEPA may be ex-
tended too far. NEPA was clearly not intended-and cannot be ex-
pected-to cover every federal action affecting the environment.8 4  An
overextension of NEPA might retard the progressive development of the
statute. To avoid overburdening NEPA, alternatives may be utilized to
bolster NEPA's broad environmental scope.
In North Carolina, significant state legislation exists that can be
used not only to supplement but also to supplant NEPA. Dredge
and fill laws, s5 sand dune regulations, 8 and the state Environmental
82. Brown, supra note 6. Brown's notation of Sierra Club v. Mason, 351 F. Supp.
419 (D. Conn. 1972), is interesting in its relation to the per se idea.
83. The need to resort to a more specific delineation is apparent in North Caro-
lina with its 2,200,000 acres of estuaries. The delineation in North Carolina might
be accomplished by resort to anticipated 1974 legislation in North Carolina. The
North Carolina Coastal Area Management Act of 1973 (H.B. 949; S.B. 614) was car-
ried over by the General Assembly for consideration in 1974. There is some expecta-
tion that the bill will pass in 1974 in some form. A central facet of the bill requires
the designation of "Areas of Environmental Concern." Such areas might easily be
used by federal agencies to represent areas in which federal activity would be subject
to a per se categorization for NEPA impact statement purposes.
84. In spite of two commentators' premature conclusion that under NEPA it is
already apparent that "'major' means 'any' and that 'significantly affecting' means 'af-
fecting,'" Cramton & Berg, supra note 5, at 518, the cases referred to in note 26 .supra,
show otherwise.
85. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 113-229 (Supp. 1973). The dredge and fill law allows
riparian owners to object to the granting of a dredge and fill permit to the Department
of Conservation and Development. The statute only allows the permit applicant or
any state agency the right to review of their objections before an agency Review
Board, with appeal to the superior court of the county where the land is situated. In
not granting adjacent riparian owners similar rights to agency and judicial review, the
statute seems to be open to constitutional attack.
86. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 104B-3 to -16 (1972). The sand dune law, unlike the
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FEDERAL ESTATE TAX
Policy Act87 can regulate activities that are perhaps beyond NEPA's
reach. Notice of such state regulation has already been taken by the
Fourth Circuit.8  The plaintiffs in Rucker could have resorted to these
state laws to enjoin the "leveling of the dunes" and the grant of the
state dredge and fill permit. With responsible local action, the state
EPA could have been enacted to force the compilation of an impact
statement for the Rucker project.89
The maturation and future vitality of NEPA may be endangered
by irritating retrogressions caused by unsuccessful attempts to apply it
in areas where it perhaps should not be used at all. Only in developing
and using the supplements and alternatives to NEPA, which already
exist in many states, can a truly comprehensive and unified body of en-
vironmental law-both state and federal-mature and gain strength.
By realizing that NEPA need not be alone, future Ruckers may be pre-
vented, and judicial determinations of whether NEPA does or does not
apply can be rendered less critical in many upcoming environmental
disputes.
WILLIAM P. FARTTHING, JR.
Federal Estate Tax--"Incidents of Ownership" in Group Life
Insurance, A Phrase Searching for Definition
Under section 2042(2) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 in-
surance on the life of a decedent is taxable to the extent that he pos-
sessed, at the time of his death, any "incidents of ownership" in the
dredge and fill statute, allows "any property owner whose property may be damaged"
by the granting of a dunes permit a right of appeal to the Board of County Commis-
sioners. Under section 104B-10, the Commissioners' action is "subject to review by
the superior court of the county by proceedings in the nature of certiorari." The dunes
legislation is intended to prevent any damage that "will not materially weaken the
dune or reduce its effectiveness as a means of protection from the effects of high wind
and water. . . ." Id. § 104B-5. The fact that defendant Willis was able to completely
level his dunes bespeaks the weakness of the dunes statute. The statute is in line
for a substantial strengthening by the North Carolina General Assembly, however.
87. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 113A-1 to -10 (Supp. 1973).
88. Civic Improvement Comm. v. Volpe, 459 F.2d 957, 958 (4th Cir. 1972) (per
curiam).
89. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 113A-8, -9 (Supp. 1973). By vote of the local gov-
erning body, the "action forcing" requirements of the state EPA, id. § 113A-4(2) (Supp.
1973), can be applied to local projects that are greater than two contiguous acres in
extent.
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